Reverse Onus and One Opportunity: Raji (2015 ONSC 801) and Scaduto (2015 ONCA 733)
Raji v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, provides an early judicial explanation of the rationale underlying Civil Rule 2.1. The decision is significant not because it created the abbreviated 2.1 written procedure, which had already been enacted in 2014, but because it expressly identified the procedural opportunities that the new mechanism was designed to restrict. That reasoning was subsequently endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733. Although Rule 2.1 was subsequently amended in 2024, the abbreviated written-response mechanism central to the reasoning in Raji remains part of the rule.
The One-Opportunity Process
In Raji, at paras. 7 and 8, the court stated:
[7] Rule 2.1 allows the court, of its own motion, to apply an attenuated process to quickly review, and where appropriate, dismiss actions which are on their faces frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. If the court is satisfied that a case may fall under rule 2.1, the plaintiff will be notified by the registrar that the plaintiff has 15 days in which to make written submissions of no more than 10 pages in length as to why the action should not be dismissed. As discussed in Gao v. Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497 (Gao No. 2), the attenuated process is important as it prevents a vexatious litigant from abusing the normal motion process.
[8] The court has always had difficulty with the Catch-22 nature of dealing with vexatious litigants. Any time that proceedings are brought to try to end a vexatious proceeding, the vexatious litigant is provided with a fresh opportunity to conduct that proceeding in a vexatious, expensive, wasteful, and abusive manner. That is, the proposed cure causes a fresh outbreak of the disease. Vexatious litigant proceedings under s. 140 of the CJA can take years and be very expensive in light of the many opportunities provided to the alleged vexatious litigant to file material, examine and cross-examine witnesses, bring interim motions, and take advantage of other available procedures. Imposing a quick and limited written process that provides one opportunity to the plaintiff to show why the claim should not be dismissed is an important advance toward meeting the goals of efficiency, affordability, and proportionality in the civil justice system as discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7.
The significance of para. 8 lies in its explicit comparison. Under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, proceedings concerning vexatious litigants may involve extensive evidentiary and procedural steps. The court identified those opportunities as a source of potential further abuse, describing Rule 2.1’s limited written procedure as an improvement precisely because it confines the plaintiff to one opportunity to demonstrate why the claim should not be dismissed.
The Practical Reverse Onus
The language used in Raji also reveals how the abbreviated process operates from the plaintiff’s perspective. The court first makes a preliminary assessment that the proceeding may qualify for dismissal under Rule 2.1. The plaintiff then receives notice and is invited to explain why the action should survive.
The procedure does not expressly reverse the formal legal burden of proving abuse of process. The court remains responsible for determining whether the requirements of Rule 2.1 are satisfied. Its practical operation, however, places the immediate burden of response on the plaintiff. If no compliant response is filed, the rule permits the court to dismiss without further notice, although dismissal is not automatic.
This is a departure from the ordinary adversarial model in which a party seeking dismissal advances the objection through a motion record. Under Rule 2.1, the court itself may initiate screening, and the plaintiff is placed in the position of explaining why the proceeding should remain before the court. Whether this amounts to a reversal of the legal onus is a separate doctrinal question. The operational burden is nonetheless apparent from the wording of the procedure and from the court's description of its purpose.
The Qualification in Raji
The court did not suggest that the abbreviated procedure should be employed whenever it would be faster or less expensive than an ordinary motion. At para. 9, it emphasized that Rule 2.1 is not intended for close cases. The abusive character of the proceeding must be apparent on the face of the pleading. The decision also identified a further consideration: there should generally be something in the pleadings supporting recourse to the abbreviated procedure itself, rather than an ordinary procedural remedy. That second consideration was described as a guideline, not an inflexible requirement.
The original rationale was therefore tied to the apparent nature of the proceeding and the risk of further procedural abuse. It was not simply that courts should dispense with ordinary processes whenever doing so would be convenient.
Appellate Endorsement in Scaduto
In Scaduto, the Court of Appeal reviewed the application of Rule 2.1 by the same motion judge who had authored Raji and the earlier Gao decisions. At para. 8, it recognized the need to interpret Rule 2.1 robustly while limiting its use to the clearest cases in which abuse is apparent on the face of the pleading. At para. 9, the Court of Appeal expressly endorsed the guidance developed from Raji, quoting paras. 8 and 9, emphasizing that Rule 2.1 is not intended for close cases and that its use must be justified by the abusive character of the proceeding apparent on its face.
The Court of Appeal did not formally declare a reverse legal onus. It endorsed the judicial framework explaining why Rule 2.1’s abbreviated procedure was appropriate and how its exceptional character should constrain its use. That endorsement brought the justification articulated in Raji into the appellate jurisprudence governing Rule 2.1.
The Unresolved Question of Delegated Authority
Section 66(2) of the Courts of Justice Act gives the Civil Rules Committee broad rule-making powers, including authority to make rules that alter or conform to substantive law. Section 66(2)(d) expressly encompasses the disposition of proceedings without a hearing and its effect. The existence of this delegation provides a statutory basis for rules governing abbreviated proceedings.
Acknowledging the delegation does not necessarily resolve every question concerning the scope of the powers exercised. The issue is whether the particular operation of Rule 2.1—including its limited written-response process, restricted evidentiary opportunities, and practical burden on the plaintiff to justify continuation—falls within the authority conferred by the Legislature.
Raji and Scaduto explain the judicial rationale for the procedure and the limits intended to govern its application. They do not expressly determine whether the procedural consequences of Rule 2.1 exceed the delegated authority in section 66. Judicial endorsement of the operation of a rule is not the same inquiry as an examination of whether the rule-making authority was lawfully exercised in establishing that procedure.
Conclusion
Raji provides an unusually direct account of the reasoning behind Rule 2.1’s abbreviated process. The court expressly identified ordinary evidentiary and procedural opportunities as potential instruments of further abuse and endorsed the limited written procedure as a means of avoiding that problem. Scaduto subsequently endorsed this approach while emphasizing that Rule 2.1 must remain an exceptional mechanism reserved for the clearest cases.
The resulting framework therefore presents a tension rather than a simple contradiction. The same procedural protections that ordinarily allow a litigant to contest dismissal are treated as potential instruments of abuse, justifying their restriction in exceptional circumstances. The critical questions are whether those exceptional circumstances are genuinely present, whether the procedure continues to preserve a meaningful opportunity to respond, and whether its consequences remain within the scope of the Legislature’s delegated authority.
The rationale articulated in Raji arose in the context of proceedings that the court considered genuinely abusive or vexatious, where ordinary procedural opportunities risked facilitating further misconduct. However, subsequent decisions such as Edusei v. Philips, 2025 ONSC 4723, and Berentschot v. Ontario, 2025 ONSC 4857, illustrate how Rule 2.1 has been extended to jurisdictional errors, including seeking relief from a court without authority to grant it. In those decisions, jurisdictional defects formed the basis for dismissal under Rule 2.1 without an express finding of deliberate misconduct.
Although Edusei involved additional procedural circumstances, both decisions illustrate the use of the abbreviated procedure to address proceedings brought before courts lacking authority to grant the requested relief. The consequence is that even a litigant who has selected the wrong procedure or remedy may be subjected to the same abbreviated, one-opportunity written process originally justified by the risk of further vexatious conduct. This raises the question whether the exceptional rationale articulated in Raji continues to justify the expanding application of Rule 2.1.
Directory of Records
Access the consolidated public records, dockets, and procedural analyses associated with this matter below.
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
1. Case Overviews & Timelines
- Case Overview: Supreme Court of Canada Docket 42381, 2026 ONCA 246 and 2.1B (2025 ONCA 90)
- History of the Jurisdictional Defect in Chowdhury (2025 ONCA 90): Rule 2.1 Applied Twice
- Wrong-Forum and “Abuse of Process”: Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Bernard Property (2019 ONCA 830)
- “Or” vs. “Or Otherwise”: Scaduto (2015 ONCA 733), Raji (2015 ONSC 801), and the Language of Rule 2.1.01
2. Constitutional Limits & Delegated Authority
- Jurisprudence of the Administrative Reverse Onus: Rule 2.1 vs. Established Precedent
- Rule 2.1, Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, and the Administrative Reverse Onus
- Rule 2.1 and the Automatic Stay: A Procedural Tension with Rule 2.01
- O. Reg. 322/24: Form 2.1A and the 2024 Amendments to Rule 2.1
- The Reverse Onus of Rule 2.1: The Practical Effect of the Automatic Stay in O. Reg. 322/24
- Form 2.1B and the Reverse Onus: Colourability and the Limits of Delegated Authority
4. Jurisdiction, Forum & Procedural Mechanics
- Rule 2.1.01 and Jurisdiction: Simpson (2016 ONCA 806), Collins (2017 ONCA 317) vs. Chowdhury
- Jurisdiction and the Initiation of Rule 2.1 Dismissals
- Rule 21.01 vs. Rule 2.1.01: "A Judge" vs. "The Court"
- Case Conference and Management: Scheduling as Adjudication (2.1B)
- Jurisdictional Contrast: Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia
- Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Ingarra (2026 ONCA 139): When Jurisdiction Becomes "Frivolous"
5. Family Rule 1.4 & Rule 2.1
- Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1 and the Rules of Procedure: Can Ontario's Rules Committees Override the Common Law?
- O. Reg. 310/26 and Family Rule 1.4: The Shifting Framework of Summary Dismissals
- The Automatic Stay and Reverse Onus in O. Reg. 310/26: How Rule 1.4 Halts a Case Before the Merits Are Heard
- Party-Initiated Summary Screening: From Civil Amendments to Rule 1.4 in O. Reg. 310/26
- Form 1.4A and Colourability: The Limits of Delegated Authority
- Primary Legislation, Delegated Rules, and Rule 1.4: A Comparative Provincial Analysis
- From Judicial Stay to Automatic Stay: Purcaru (2016 ONSC 1609) and Rule 1.4
- Dowson v. R., Katz Group, Auer, Abrametz, Civil Rule 2.1, and Family Rule 1.4: Can Ontario's Rules Committees Create an Automatic Stay?
- Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1, and Jurisdictional Screening: Chowdhury, Amstar, Simpson, and Collins
Statutory References