Case Overview: Supreme Court of Canada Docket 42381, 2026 ONCA 246 and 2.1B (2025 ONCA 90)
Case 2026 ONCA 246, the published ruling for COA-25-CV-1731, is on CanLII and is recorded on the Supreme Court of Canada docket for File No. 42381.
Official docket: https://www.scc-csc.ca/cases-dossiers/search-recherche/42381/
From the decision:
[5] We agree that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A purported appeal that clearly does not engage the jurisdiction of this court is an abuse of process and is properly dismissed under r. 2.1.01: Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto, 2025 ONCA 90, at para. 4.
[6] An order made by a single judge of the Divisional Court may not be appealed as of right to this court. Section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”), referred to by the appellant is inapplicable to such an order. If the order of the single judge of the Divisional Court is made on a motion, the route to challenge it is by a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the CJA, not by an appeal to this court: Bernard Property Maintenance v. Taylor, 2019 ONCA 830, 148 O.R. (3d) 494, at paras. 1-3. In all other cases, an appeal from an order of the Divisional Court is governed by s. 6(1)(a) of the CJA, not s. 6(1)(b). Such an appeal may only be brought with leave of this court.
The panel held that the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court applied Taylor to a case-conference direction of abeyance, held it was not appealable due to lack of right of the court (para. 6), and set the routes: a panel of the Divisional Court under section 21(5) if the direction was made on a motion; leave under section 6(1)(a) if it was not (para. 6).
The route in para. 6 is the jurisdiction: a panel of the Divisional Court, or leave.
Para. 5 states lack of jurisdiction as the actual finding: a purported appeal that clearly does not engage the Court’s jurisdiction is an abuse of process, citing Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 90, at para. 4, and is dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.
Rule 2.1.01(1) authorizes the court to stay or dismiss a proceeding if it appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
In 2026 ONCA 246, the Court simultaneously determined it had no jurisdiction in para. 5, and made a finding of abuse of process in the same para.
Overview of the Jurisdictional Error
In 2026 ONCA 246, the endorsement of the Court of Appeal advances two concurrent, yet legally incompatible, propositions: first, that the appeal does not engage the Court’s statutory jurisdiction (the proper appellate routes resting with the Divisional Court or by way of leave); and second, that the filing constitutes an "abuse of process" properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
From Seo v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2026 ONCA 246 [note 1], para. 5:
[5] We agree that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A purported appeal that clearly does not engage the jurisdiction of this court is an abuse of process and is properly dismissed under r. 2.1.01: Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto, 2025 ONCA 90, at para. 4.
It is a settled constitutional principle that appellate courts are exclusively creatures of statute. They do not possess the inherent jurisdiction characteristic of superior trial courts (Kourtessis v. M.N.R., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53). Consequently, any authority an appellate court wields to control its own process—including the power to summarily dismiss a proceeding as an abuse of process—is strictly an implied power. This implied power exists solely to enable the court to manage matters that fall within its lawful purview (Cunningham v. Lilles, 2010 SCC 10). As such, an implied power must be inextricably anchored to a valid grant of statutory jurisdiction; it cannot be exercised in a legal vacuum over a matter that rests wholly outside the court’s legislative reach (MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725).
By explicitly recording in its endorsement that the matter does not engage its jurisdiction, the Court formally acknowledged the absence of its statutory anchor. On the binding authorities above, the severance of this statutory anchor necessarily extinguishes any ancillary or implied powers. Once the anchor is removed, the implied power to evaluate the litigant's conduct and characterize the filing as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 is simultaneously extinguished. A statutory court cannot render a substantive, punitive finding upon a proceeding it has formally determined it possesses no legal authority to entertain.
The necessary legal consequence is that the Court's declaration of an "abuse of process" represents an ultra vires exercise of power. Under foundational principles of administrative and constitutional law, an adjudicative act taken in the strict absence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal nullity. The resulting declaration is therefore void ab initio and of no force or effect.
The constitutional issue extends beyond the mere dismissal of the proceeding; it carries the inherent risk of unlawful expropriation whenever costs are awarded. If an appellate court attaches a costs award to an ultra vires Rule 2.1.01 dismissal, it executes a deprivation of property without lawful authority. The court leverages the power of the State to compel a financial transfer based on a jurisdictional foundation it explicitly admits it does not possess. Consequently, any attempt to enforce such a costs order—whether by wage garnishment, seizure, or lien—would constitute the enforcement of an invalid state instrument.
Because this contradictory framework operates as a systemic administrative pipeline—anchored by the Chowdhury template—it opens the door to financial orders made under a jurisdictional deficit. As these specific Chowdhury-style endorsements are void ab initio, any costs award attached to them is inherently nullified. Any entity that collects these costs, including the Crown or private respondents, would consequently be placed in an indefensible position of unjust enrichment, having extracted funds under the colour of a void judicial order. This exposes both the judicial system and potential collecting parties to massive, tangled liability.
Note 1: The formal title for 2026 ONCA 246 is abbreviated to Seo v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), omitting the City of Toronto. However, as documented in the Supreme Court of Canada registry for File No. 42381 (Ian Seo v. Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, et al.), the proceedings definitively involved both respondents.
Simpson (2016 ONCA 806) and Collins (2017 ONCA 317) vs. Chowdhury (2025 ONCA 90)
From 2026 ONCA 246:
[4] The City seeks an order dismissing the appeal under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, because it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process of the court. The City contends that Shore J.’s direction was procedural, and the route to challenge it is by a further proceeding in the Divisional Court. In the alternative, the City contends that an order of the Divisional Court may only be appealed to this court with leave, which the appellant has not obtained or even sought.
In para. 4, the Court of Appeal states the City’s request for a Rule 2.1.01 dismissal was based on jurisdiction (venue and leave). The Court granted that request, citing Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 90, and held the appeal did not engage its jurisdiction and was an abuse of process properly dismissed.
From Chowdhury, para. 4:
[4] The clear lack of jurisdiction is sufficient to render the motion for leave to appeal an abuse of process.
From Collins, para. 19:
[19] Ontario and Canada clearly take the view that Ms. Collins’ appeals lack merit. Absence of merit on its own, even assuming such absence, is not sufficient to justify dismissal under r. 2.1. Simpson, at para. 43, makes it clear that a r. 2.1 request is not a substitute for a motion to quash and filing the appropriate materials. The rule does not replace the bringing of a motion to quash an appeal for want of jurisdiction or for lack of merit. However, it does allow for a speedy process for disposing of proceedings and motions that on their face are frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process.
Collins v. Ontario, 2017 ONCA 317, is the earlier decision of the same Court. Relying on Simpson v. The Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806, it held that Rule 2.1 does not replace a motion to quash an appeal for want of jurisdiction or for lack of merit.
Stare decisis leaves Simpson (2016 ONCA 806) and Collins (2017 ONCA 317) as the operative binding authorities on the limit of the rule. Chowdhury (2025 ONCA 90) stated the opposite, and 2026 ONCA 246 then treated that sentence as the rule. The later decisions did not overrule Simpson or Collins. They did not cite them.
A court asked to follow para. 4 of Chowdhury (2025 ONCA 90), or the citation of it in 2026 ONCA 246, remains bound to Simpson (2016 ONCA 806) and Collins (2017 ONCA 317).
Directory of Records
Access the consolidated public records, dockets, and procedural analyses associated with this matter below.
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
1. Case Overviews & Timelines
- History of the Jurisdictional Defect in Chowdhury (2025 ONCA 90): Rule 2.1 Applied Twice
- Wrong-Forum and “Abuse of Process”: Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Bernard Property (2019 ONCA 830)
- “Or” vs. “Or Otherwise”: Scaduto (2015 ONCA 733), Raji (2015 ONSC 801), and the Language of Rule 2.1.01
- Reverse Onus and One Opportunity: Raji (2015 ONSC 801) and Scaduto (2015 ONCA 733)
2. Constitutional Limits & Delegated Authority
- Jurisprudence of the Administrative Reverse Onus: Rule 2.1 vs. Established Precedent
- Rule 2.1, Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, and the Administrative Reverse Onus
- Rule 2.1 and the Automatic Stay: A Procedural Tension with Rule 2.01
- O. Reg. 322/24: Form 2.1A and the 2024 Amendments to Rule 2.1
- The Reverse Onus of Rule 2.1: The Practical Effect of the Automatic Stay in O. Reg. 322/24
- Form 2.1B and the Reverse Onus: Colourability and the Limits of Delegated Authority
4. Jurisdiction, Forum & Procedural Mechanics
- Rule 2.1.01 and Jurisdiction: Simpson (2016 ONCA 806), Collins (2017 ONCA 317) vs. Chowdhury
- Jurisdiction and the Initiation of Rule 2.1 Dismissals
- Rule 21.01 vs. Rule 2.1.01: "A Judge" vs. "The Court"
- Case Conference and Management: Scheduling as Adjudication (2.1B)
- Jurisdictional Contrast: Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia
- Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Ingarra (2026 ONCA 139): When Jurisdiction Becomes "Frivolous"
5. Family Rule 1.4 & Rule 2.1
- Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1 and the Rules of Procedure: Can Ontario's Rules Committees Override the Common Law?
- O. Reg. 310/26 and Family Rule 1.4: The Shifting Framework of Summary Dismissals
- The Automatic Stay and Reverse Onus in O. Reg. 310/26: How Rule 1.4 Halts a Case Before the Merits Are Heard
- Party-Initiated Summary Screening: From Civil Amendments to Rule 1.4 in O. Reg. 310/26
- Form 1.4A and Colourability: The Limits of Delegated Authority
- Primary Legislation, Delegated Rules, and Rule 1.4: A Comparative Provincial Analysis
- From Judicial Stay to Automatic Stay: Purcaru (2016 ONSC 1609) and Rule 1.4
- Dowson v. R., Katz Group, Auer, Abrametz, Civil Rule 2.1, and Family Rule 1.4: Can Ontario's Rules Committees Create an Automatic Stay?
- Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1, and Jurisdictional Screening: Chowdhury, Amstar, Simpson, and Collins
Statutory References
Revision Ledger
- [2026-10-20] v1.3: Integrated Overview of the Jurisdictional Error.
- [2026-10-18] v1.2: Updated titles, headings, and integration of Simpson. Added Simpson to directory structure.
- [2026-10-10] v1.1: Added Chowdhury vs. Collins.
- [2026-10-09] v1.0: Initial publication of Case Overview.